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INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of the first religious war in France in 1562 marked the beginning 
of a prolonged and acute crisis which was to beset the kingdom for decades and 
which cannot be explained solely by the intensity of both sides’ doctrinal zeal. 
Economic, social, political and legal factors were all at play, thus adding to the 
complexity of the conflict. In its process the military and financial weakness of the 
monarchy soon became evident as the royal armies were unable to deal a decisive 
blow to the Huguenot movement sturdily entrenched in the southern regions of 
France. The monarchy’s simultaneous inability to forge a durable compromise 
furtherly exposed its deficiency and clearly indicated that the rising tensions could 
no longer be contained by the institutional and political framework of the kingdom. 
Desperate measures ensued, only to make the situation worse as the radicalization 
of Huguenots (and in due course also of the staunchest Catholics) after the assas-
sination of their leaders in August 1572 and the subsequent outburst of popular 
violence towards the Protestant minority clearly showed. By November 1576 (and 
after 5 inconclusive wars in a period of merely 24 years) when the meeting of the 
Estates General began in Blois, no one doubted the profoundness of the crisis.1 
The state of lasting conflict prompted both sophisticated theorists and partisan 
pamphleteers to produce treatises offering solutions supposedly capable of mend-
ing the dysfunctional body-politic. Jean Bodin’s Les Six livres de la République 
1 For a detailed analysis of the widespread reformist sentiment in the French society during the 
Wars of Religion see M. Greengrass, Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French King-
dom, 1576–1585, Oxford 2007.
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(henceforth République) published early in 1576 clearly stood out, as it offered 
a comprehensive theory of the state unified by a single sovereign power that al-
lowed the commonwealth to exist in the first place and that, if it had been properly 
understood, would have protected it from the raging anarchy.2 On the other side of 
the confessional barricade, Huguenots were waging their own ideological battles 
against the crown, trying to come up with arguments that would allow them to 
justify their resistance and at the same time not to present themselves as a seditious 
minority threatening the stability of the kingdom.3 The most sophisticated treatise 
belonging to that tradition of thought was Vindiciae, contra tyrannos published 
anonymously in 1579, but probably written five years previously either by Philipp 
du Plessis Mornay or Hubert Languet (we shall refer to the author of the Vindiciae 
as Brutus – the pseudonym he himself employed).4 Both République and Vindiciae, 
contra tyrannos have been studied extensively (although the former has drawn 
much wider attention). The scholarly debate regarding the former seems to be 
centred around the relationship between Bodin’s concept of sovereignty and the 
rise of absolutism5, whereas the latter is usually placed firmly within the context 
of the so-called Huguenot theory of revolution, as its last, most consistent piece.6 
2 Bodin clearly stated that that was his aim in the preface to the first French edition of 1576 
where he presented himself as giving advice on the proper legal and political arrangement of the 
commonwealth and denouncing the pernicious theories advocated by “Machiavellians” and preach-
ers of popular sovereignty (clearly referring to the Monarchomach theories) that had, in his eyes, 
disastrous effects. J.H.M. Salmon, Bodin and the Monarchomachs [in:] idem, Renaissance and Re-
volt: Essays in the intellectual and social history of early modern France, Cambridge 1987, p. 121.
3 To be sure, that “moderate” approach was not the only one present among the Huguenots. See 
R. Kingdon, Calvinism and resistance theory, 1550–1580 [in:] J.H. Burns, M. Goldie (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700, Cambridge 1991, pp. 193–218. 
4 A detailed discussion of the problem of authorship and the publication date can be found in 
G. Garnett, Introduction [in:] Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae, contra tyrannos: or, concerning the 
legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince, transl. and ed. G. Gar- 
nett, Cambridge 1994, pp. xx–xxii (date), lv–lxxvi (authorship).
5 A classic work that presented Bodin’s supposed adoption of absolutism in République as a de-
cisive break with his earlier “constitutional” theories presented in Methodus ad facilem historiarum 
cognitionem (1566) is J.H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the rise of absolutist theory, Cambridge 1973. 
This vision has been criticized by other scholars who pointed out that Bodin was far from advocat-
ing unbridled, absolute power of the king, and that his theory of state evolved gradually much like 
that of Th. Hobbes in De cive and Leviathan. See R. Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention 
of Modern Democracy, Cambridge 2015, pp. 56–62; D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern 
Constitutional Thought, Oxford 2016, pp. 187–188.
6 A classic analysis is: Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2: The 
Age of Reformation, Cambridge 1978, pp. 302–338. Anne McLaren has recently criticized the schol-
arly focus on the influence of Roman law tradition in Vindiciae, advocating in turn a more reli-
gion-based interpretation. A. McLaren, Rethinking Republicanism: “Vindiciae, contra tyrannos” in 
Context, “The Historical Journal” 2006, Vol. 49, No. 1. For a persuasive refutation see: G. Garnett, 
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It is not the aim of this paper to contest these perspectives, but rather to look at 
both treatises from a slightly different angle – namely as answers to the ongoing 
institutional crisis of the monarchy, especially as seen through the lenses of strictly 
interdependent issues of decentralization and inadequacy of the royal administra-
tion. It should at once be pointed out that neither of these works was written as 
a direct response to that specific problematic, let alone exclusively for that purpose. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued that the specific tension between the royal adminis-
tration and the complicated structure of local networks of power not only rendered 
it impossible for both Bodin and Brutus not to take a stance on that matter but also 
influenced their theories. Accordingly, we shall begin with a brief description of 
the institutional structure of the French kingdom prior to the outbreak of the Wars 
of Religion which quickly proved inadequate once the conflict commenced. The 
emphasis will be put on the fragile cooperation between the royal government in 
Paris and virtually innumerable local institutions and territorial networks of power 
that allowed the Valois kings to control the state in times of relative stability, but 
which collapsed when faced with the internal struggle and proactive contestation of 
kingly authority. That introductory chapter will form the bedrock for the subsequent 
analysis of how Brutus and Bodin tried to incorporate the complex institutional 
reality of the French kingdom into their own theories. As a result, we hope to shed 
some light at the peculiar ways that Bodin and Brutus tried to circumvent the 
problems posed by the existence of local power networks, defused or used them 
to their own advantage as well as how it limited their theories. 
THE CRISIS OF THE MONARCHY
For the purposes of this paper, three institutional aspects of the Renaissance 
Valois monarchy in the years preceding the outbreak of the Wars of Religion are of 
particular importance.7 In the first place it ought to be noted that the French victory 
in the Hundred Years War and the subsequent incorporation of Burgundy (1477), 
Provence (1481), and Britanny (1491) – domains with long traditions of indepen-
dence – brought somewhat paradoxical results. On the one hand, having finally 
defeated the English and solidified their internal position, the French monarchs 
seemed stronger than ever before. On the other hand, it soon became obvious that 
the cooperation of local elites, a certain acceptance of particularism which grew in 
Law in the “Vindiciae, contra tyrannos”: a Vindication, “The Historical Journal” 2006, Vol. 49, 
No. 3.
7 The following description of the French monarchy is largely based on J. Russell Major, From 
Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles, and Estates, Baltimore 1994, 
pp. 3–56.
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strength during the war was indispensable if the kingdom was to operate effectively 
and be able to withstand its own territorial expansion. The provincial sovereign 
courts were established to administer justice on king’s behalf, the local assemblies 
were frequently consulted and their right to consent to taxation (if they did possess 
it) was usually respected. As J. Russell Major put it: “In fact, by accepting, nay, 
even encouraging, provincial autonomy and by respecting the privileges of their 
subjects, Charles [VIII] and Louis [XII] strengthened the monarchy. People with 
little historical association with the crown, like those of Dauphiné and Provence, 
and those who had been devoted to their dukes, like the Burgundians, learned to 
become loyal subjects. In an age when the crown had neither an adequate army 
nor a bureaucracy to compel obedience, this accomplishment was of the highest 
importance.”8 For all the rationality of that policy however, the decentralization 
of the administration of justice and acceptance of the existing network of local 
assemblies meant that the French kings had to take this institutional structure into 
account when shaping their strategy, even though their adherents never failed to 
underscore the constitutional right of the king to enforce his will regardless of 
other loci of power.9
Secondly, the ability to enforce various institutions to obey royal commands 
proved indispensable as the ever-rising costs of war in Italy, increasing inflation, 
and at times lavish expenses of the court were forcing the Valois monarchs to seek 
new sources of revenue. That was especially true during the reign of Francis I and 
his successors, who never failed to avail themselves of any opportunity to generate 
additional income. They found these opportunities in selling offices (more often 
than not created specifically in order to be sold),10 imposing new types of taxes or 
increasing the old ones and borrowing heavily (typically from their subjects). All 
these measures, however, not only failed to prevent the financial situation of the 
subsequent kings from deteriorating, but caused the royal debt to soar to an unprec-
edented level, forcing the crown to seek closer cooperation with their increasingly 
impatient and already heavily burdened subjects. By 1560, merely two years before 
the first War of Religion, there was no other way of funding royal expenses but to 
call a meeting of the Estates General – a clear sign of the monarchy’s vulnerabil-
ity and a significant encouragement to all those who advocated a more inclusive, 
8 Ibidem, p. 24.
9 As chancellor l’Hopital did on behalf of Charles IX in the opening speech of the Estates Gen-
eral in 1561. Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, p. 256. In financial matters kings often invoked 
the doctrine of “evident necessity” to impose taxes without assemblies’ consent which allowed them 
to obtain necessary revenue and maintain the impression of operating within the constitutional struc-
ture of the kingdom. J. Russell Major, From Renaissance Monarchy..., pp. 16–19. 
10 J. Rusell Major, From Renaissance Monarchy..., pp. 104–105.
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decentralized constitutional shape of the monarchy and called for more frequent 
meetings of local assemblies and the Estates General alike.11 
Thirdly, the simultaneous growth of the corps of professional royal officers 
(partially as a result of the venality of offices, partially due to genuine efforts to 
create more efficient system of administration) caused strong resentment toward 
the representatives of the central government on the part of local, “old” nobility, 
who saw these developments as grave threats to their traditional role as enforcers 
of the royal will in their localities.12 Nevertheless, the traditional ties of deference 
formed into an elaborate system of clientage still played a vital role in the func-
tioning of the monarchy as “kings, who could win the loyalty of their greatest 
nobles by distributing patronage and others favours judiciously, found that through 
these nobles they could penetrate into the provinces and still lower reaches of 
the government.”13 Crucially, however, as soon as royal power suffered a severe 
blow with the death of Henry II in 1559 and then was constantly undermined by 
powerful noble factions (Guises, Bourbons, etc.) and the ongoing civil war, those 
very same channels of influence turned out to be a double-edged weapon as the 
competing sides used them to muster their own supporters and solidify areas under 
their control.14 The tension between the expanding centralized administration and 
the particularism of the provinces, the constant need of money on the king’s part 
that forced him to seek the approval of his policy from his subjects, the complex 
network of clientage – these three aspects of political reality of the sixteenth-cen-
11 Ibidem, pp. 113–114.
12 During the Estates General of 1560 and 1561 the secular estates protested vehemently 
against the new nobility (noblesse de robe) closely tied to the growing royal administration, as well 
as against the taxation of their own wealth. Both secular estates were only willing to agree for the 
taxation of the other two, thus not only thwarting king’s hopes but also failing to recognize that their 
refusal to aid the crown rendered future meetings of the Estates General rather unlikely. The cler-
gy, having agreed to help the monarch financially, was to be convoked relatively frequently in the 
decades to come. See J. Russell Major, The Third Estate in the Estates General of Pontoise, 1561, 
“Speculum” 1954, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 460–476.
13 J. Russell Major, From Renaissance Monarchy..., p. 95. There has been a debate, initiated 
by Robert Harding, whether the clientage system was gradually losing its importance during the 
Wars of Religion in favour of new, ideological rather than personal ties based on “party” system. 
Harding claimed that that was indeed the case, but detailed case-studies conducted inter alios by 
Mark Greengrass and Sharon Kettering showed that the client-patron ties did not disappear with the 
advent of party allegiances during the Wars of Religion but functioned within them and lasted well 
into the 17th century. R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early 
Modern France, New Haven 1978, pp. 68–87; M. Greengrass, Noble Affinities in Early Modern 
France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France, “European History Quarterly” 
1986, No. 16; S. Kettering, Clientage during the French Wars of Religion, “The Sixteenth Century 
Journal” 1989, Vol. 20, No. 2.
14 M. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629, Cambridge 2005, p. 51.
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tury France seriously crippled the ability of the monarchy to address the challenges 
posed by the Wars of Religion.
 The course of the fifth and sixth Religious Wars (1574–1577) can very well 
serve as an example of how exactly these institutional constrains curtailed the power 
of the central government. The smouldering hostilities in the provinces escalated 
into a full-blown conflict when king Henry III failed to control his own brother 
and heir presumptive – the duke d’Alençon, who fled the court in September 1575 
and began to actively denounce the royal government in order to build his own 
position – if need be by siding with Huguenots and employing their arguments 
to criticize the unconstitutional actions of the king.15 A coalition was formed, 
led by d’Alençon, great Huguenot nobles – Condé and Navarre (who escaped 
from the court in February 1576), alongside the Catholic magnate and Governor 
of Languedoc – Henri I de Montmercy. The royal army was unable to capture 
fortified settlements, not for the first time during the Wars of Religion proving its 
weakness.16 The rebel army combined with German mercenaries under Casimir 
of Palatinate was clearly superior to the forces loyal to the heavily indebted king 
who had no choice but to negotiate a settlement. The Edict of Beaulieu was issued 
on 6 May 1576. The Huguenots were allowed to worship publicly in all France 
(with the exception of Paris), special chambres-mi-partes were established to ad-
judicate cases involving litigants of both religions, the Estates General were to be 
convoked in order to discuss the long-overdue reform of the kingdom.17 To be sure, 
Alençon’s ambitions had also been satisfied – a generous grant of domains finally 
allowed him to expand his network of clients.18 The Estates General that met at 
Blois in November 1576 turned out to be a disappointment for both the king and 
the Huguenots. The discussion immediately turned to the question of religion rather 
than to the financial aid to the monarchy as the king had hoped. In the absence of 
any substantial representation of the Huguenots, and under increasing pressure 
from Catholic leagues that sprang up in the provinces as the outrage caused by the 
Edict of Beaulieu intensified, the king effectively decided to go back on his word 
and proclaim (albeit indirectly) the exclusive Catholicity of the kingdom, thus 
making another war inevitable.19 Characteristically, however, the Estates General 
refused to provide the king with financial support.20 The pattern was then bound 
15 Ibidem, pp. 104–105.
16 M. Greengrass, Governing Passions..., p. 30.
17 M. Holt, The French Wars..., pp. 106–107.
18 His household increased from 415 members before the edict to 942 when, in addition to 
numerous domains, he was granted the former title of his brother – duke d’Anjou. S. Kettering, 
Clientage..., p. 238.
19 M. Greengrass, Governing Passions..., pp. 88–89.
20 E.g. the list of grievances presented to Henry III by the nobility was long and included is-
sues such as venality of offices, growth of noblesse de robe and the need to create new general tax 
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to be repeated. The poorly equipped royal army could not force the Huguenots 
into obedience. Another settlement followed, this time concluded in Bergerac in 
September 1577. As with the previous peace agreements, the difficulty did not lie 
in signing a document, but in carrying out its provisions. 
The subsequent two years of struggle to pacify the provinces and enforce the 
terms of the agreement yet again showcased the fragility of the royal power. Each 
province had its own convoluted political and personal arrangement which created 
a variety of different problems.21 Sovereign parliaments were unwilling to register 
the peace; the attitudes of minor officials were heavily reliant on local circum-
stances.22 The Queen Mother Catherine de Medici herself went on a tour around 
the southern provinces in order to personally resolve at least part of the seemingly 
innumerable local conundrums that rendered the “king’s peace” so fragile.23 A val-
iant effort that brought only temporary results, if it managed to bring any at all. In 
1579, merely two years after the Bergerac peace, yet another war broke out. 
The French monarch was simply unable to pacify the country that was so divided 
both ideologically and institutionally, especially because his own powers relied so 
heavily on the net of decentralized power structures. As Mark Greengrass puts it: 
“the enforcement of the peace of Bergerac was not simply the implementation of 
an act of state. Its success relied on informal power structures. Secretaries, écueyrs, 
masters of the horse, illegitimate sons, friends of the family carried verbal mes-
sages, letters, and memoranda to curry friendship, beg favour, dispel a rumour, or 
divulge a secret. Between the king, his secretaries, and senior courtiers on the one 
hand, and the governors, lieutenants, marshals, and admirals of the French aristo-
cratic firmament on the other, lay reticulations of influence which complemented 
taillon ordinaire to fund the army – of course to be paid exclusively by the third estate. M.P. Holt, At-
titudes of the French Nobility at the Estates-General of 1576, “The Sixteenth Century Journal” 1987, 
Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 493.
21 Suffice it to say that in Languedoc the Governor tasked with overseeing the implementation 
of the peace of Bergerac was Henri I de Montmercy – the very same noble who took part in the fifth 
War of Religion on the Huguenot side, hardly a loyal, dedicated royal officer. Ibidem, pp. 142–143. 
22 See for example a case-study of the town of Chalons-sur-Marne in which the king, the Guise 
governor and the city council all had their own agenda and fought for influence and control over 
local policy. M. Konnert, Provincial Governors and Their Regimes during the French Wars of Re-
ligion: The Duc de Guise and the City Council of Chalons-sur-Marne, “The Sixteenth Century 
Journal” 1994, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 833–835.
23 The Queen quickly learned how many local networks of power existed in the south-western 
France and how difficult it was to convince their members to settle down and respect the terms of 
the Bergerac settlement. M. Greengrass, Governing Passions..., pp. 189–192. The tour of 1579 was 
not the first one in Catherine’s de Medici political career. Back in 1564-66 she organised ‘le grand 
voyage de France’ of her son Charles IX in order to castigate the unruly provincial sovereign courts 
that were refusing to register a new edict of tolerance. A direct king’s intervention in the form of lits 
de justice forced the courts to register the document, but the necessity of personal involvement of 
the monarch was an ominous sign. M. Holt, The French Wars..., pp. 58–63.
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the official state at every turn. The distant officialdom of the state was tamed by 
endless requests for a generous decision in this instance, the gift of an office for 
that relative, the imperative claims to respect a family connection or reclaim a past 
favour.”24 The institutional framework of the sixteenth-century France was anything 
but simple. We shall now examine how both Bodin and Brutus incorporated it into 
their theories.
RÉPUBLIQUE
Jean Bodin published République, his most famous work on political theory, in 
1576 in the middle of the fifth War of Religion and merely few months before the 
meeting of the Estates General in Blois during which he took a very active role as 
an advocate of a moderate, anti-war policy.25 Despite this highly relevant moment 
of publication, Bodin’s theory was not simply a product created specifically in 
order to support the king in his struggle against those who contested his authority. 
It has been convincingly argued that Bodin’s thought developed over time and that 
to see in République a drastic change of opinion or complete abandonment of the 
theories presented in 1566 (in Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem) is 
an exaggeration.26 That of course is not say that Bodin was free from involvement, 
also on theoretical grounds, in the current affairs of the French kingdom. Perhaps 
the most compelling evidence to that effect (if his unequivocal statements from 
the subsequent prefaces are not enough)27 is that he decided to publish the book in 
French and only later began to deliberately style himself as a cool-headed theorist 
formulating his opinions without paying attention to the brutal world of day-to-day 
political strife.28 
Regardless of these considerations, it is generally acknowledged that Bodin 
was the first political thinker to produce a comprehensive theory of sovereignty 
as a power unifying the commonwealth and of sovereign as essentially unbound 
24 M. Greengrass, Governing Passions..., p. 145.
25 A description of Bodin’s activity during the Estates General can be found in O. Ulph, Jean 
Bodin and the Estates-General of 1576, “The Journal of Modern History” 1947, Vol. 19, No. 4. 
For a recent, detailed account see H.A. Lloyd, Jean Bodin, ‘This Pre-eminent Man of France’: An 
Intellectual Biography, Oxford 2017, pp. 159–188. The moment of République’s publication was 
not a coincidence. The kingdom was full of polemical literature, including that penned by Henry III 
himself. Ibidem, p. 117.
26 We have already indicated this shift of scholarly opinion. See G. Garnett, Introduction.
27 Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, p. 285.
28 For an analysis of Bodin’s approach to that matter see A.M. Blair, Authorial Strategies in 
Jean Bodin [in:] H.A. Lloyd (ed.), Jean Bodin. The Reception of Bodin, Leiden 2013. 
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by positive law which is but an expression of his will.29 But how did the complex 
institutional structure of the French kingdom fit into this theory? Was it to be 
replaced with the all-embracing, rationalized system of administration controlled 
from Paris, or was it allowed to exist? A brief outline of Bodin’s theory of state is 
necessary before we attempt to answer this question.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Bodin’s theoretical undertakings was 
his search for universal principles that would allow for a truly scientific analysis of 
the state and its powers.30 Bodin rejected the approach of both the Bartolists who 
treated the Roman civil law as a source of rules applicable regardless of spatial and 
temporal context, and of the legal humanists such as Alciato on the grounds that 
they blurred the distinction between private and public law by employing concepts 
derived from the Roman civil law to analyse the reciprocal powers of the prince and 
his subjects.31 He turned instead to historical, comparative studies of constitutional 
arrangements of various commonwealths with hopes of finding a common feature 
that could be used as a departure point for the scientific analysis of the state.32 Bodin 
summarized his findings in the opening passage of République famously stating 
that “a Commonweale is a lawfull government of many families, and of that which 
unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soveraigntie.”33 Succinct as that 
definition is, it forms a foundation upon which the entire subsequent analysis hinges, 
very much in line with Bodin’s intentions.34 The distinctive feature of political 
life is the existence of a sovereign power within the state for “a Commonweale 
29 It has been argued quite convincingly that Bodin’s theory of sovereign power that stands 
above the positive law owes much to the thought of medieval jurists who presented rulers as legibus 
soluti (and yet at the same time subject to the constraints imposed by the natural and divine law). 
According to that interpretation, Bodin’s greatest achievement was not really to invent new catego-
ries of thinking about the sovereign power, but rather to incorporate them into a comprehensive, 
well-presented theory available to a wider public. See K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 
1200–1600: Sovereignty and Rights in Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley 1993, pp. 276–284.
30 For Peter Ramus as a possible source of Bodin’s inspiration see K.D. McRae, Ramist Ten-
dencies in the Thought of Jean Bodin, „Journal of the History of Ideas” 1955, Vol. 16, No. 3. Ramus, 
however, never took it upon himself to thoroughly apply his logic to the realm of politics.
31 D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., pp. 166–168.
32 As Marie-Dominique Couzinet puts it, Bodin advocated a more proactive approach to history 
(writing rather than reading of history) and thought that: “[...] in history the best part of universal law 
lies hidden, and what is of great weight and importance for the best judgement of legislation – the 
custom of the peoples, and the beginnings, growth, conditions, changes, and decline of all states – 
are obtained from it.” M.-D. Couzinet, On Bodin’s Method [in:] H.A. Lloyd (ed.), Jean Bodin..., pp. 
45–46.
33 J. Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, transl. R. Knolles, ed. K.D. McRae, Cambridge 
1962, p. 1.
34 As he puts it: “This definition omitted by them which have written of a Commonweale, wee 
have placed in the first place: for that in all arts and actions, it behoveth us first to behold the end, 
and afterward the meanes to attaine thereunto.” Ibidem.
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without a soveraintie of power, which uniteth in one body all the members and 
families of the same is no more a common weale, neither can by any meanes long 
endure.”35 
That in any political community there has to be a person, or an institution 
entitled to issue commands and demand obedience was a commonplace. Bodin’s 
importance lay in the fact that he set aside the complicated, variable and historically 
generated structure of rights and legal obligations and isolated a single, overriding 
power that had to exist beneath (or rather above) that structure and ultimately al-
lowed it to exist.36 Bodin’s opinion on the exact extent and character of that power 
accounts for his subsequent reception as an advocate of absolute monarchy.37 As 
he famously put it: “Majestie or Sovereigntie is the most high, absolute, and per-
petuall power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweale: which the Latines 
cal Maiestatem.”38 That maiestas or the supreme power within the state was to be 
seen as emanating from sovereign’s unique capacity to legislate. “Under this same 
sovereigntie of power for the giving and abrogating of the law, are comprised all the 
other rights & marks of sovereignty: so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that 
there is but this only mark of soveraigne power considering that all other the rights 
thereof are contained in this, viz. to have power to give lawes unto all and everie 
one of the subjects, & to receive none from them.”39 This all-embracing power of 
the sovereign to control, through his legislative capacity, virtually every aspect of 
the commonwealth is then explained to be “absolute” in a sense that had already 
been present in medieval jurisprudence – it is a maiestas legibus soluta – sovereign 
power freed from the constrains of positive law, including custom, which “hath no 
force by sufferance, and so long as it pleaseth the soveraigne prince, who may make 
thereof a law, by putting thereunto his owne confirmation.”40 The constraints did 
exist, however, in the form of natural and divine law (ius gentium was excluded)41 
and in the form of legal limitations inherent in the constitutional structure of the 
commonwealth itself which ultimately served to safeguard the sovereign power 
from jeopardizing its own position. In the French context there were two limitations 
of that kind – the Salic law which ensured the male inheritance of the crown and 
35 Ibidem, pp. 9–10.
36 Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, pp. 287–288. 
37 There were however, some anti-absolutist thinkers who tried to make use of Bodin’s theory 
for their own purposes. See a useful discussion in J.H.M. Salmon, The Legacy of Jean Bodin: Abso-
lutism, Populism or Constitutionalism?, “History of Political Thought” 1996, Vol. 17, No. 4. 
38 J. Bodin, The Six Bookes..., p. 84.
39 Ibidem, pp. 162–163.
40 Ibidem, p. 162.
41 See for example Bodin’s discussion of slavery, which used to be a part of ius gentium, but 
could not be accepted and was subsequently abandoned. The laws of nature and the divine law can-
not be changed. Ibidem, pp. 44–46.
 SOVEREIGNTY AND DECENTRALIZATION – TWO COMPETING PERSPECTIVES 155
the inalienability of the royal domain which formed the bedrock of sovereign’s 
power.42 
Despite these limitations, which Bodin never failed to mention when faced with 
charges of giving up too much power to the sovereign-king, the relative simplicity 
of his theoretical construction appealed to many as it genuinely seemed to offer 
a remedy to anarchy by simply stating that the last word, the ultimate capacity to 
decide on matters concerning the commonwealth belongs to the sovereign. What 
followed was a complete repudiation of the Monarchomach theories of revolution, 
one which was perhaps all the more decisive because it did not attempt to combat 
them by pointing out inherent loopholes, inconsistencies, or outright manipulation 
but rather by creating new category of analysis while simultaneously discarding 
the assumptions upon which Monarchomachs so heavily relied. The logic of his 
argument based on truly supreme power simply leaves no place for legitimate re-
sistance; Bodin is unequivocal in that regard, clearly stating that “[...] if the prince 
be an absolute Soveraigne,” as he thought was the case in France, then “it is not 
lawfull for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt 
any thing either by way of fact, or of justice against the honour, life, or dignitie 
of the soveraigne: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, impietie, and 
crueltie that could be spoken.”43
Crucially, however, this vision of sovereign power bound only by few funda-
mental laws of the realm as well as by the traditional dictates of natural and divine 
law forms but one side of Bodin’s theory. The other one, perhaps more important 
from the perspective of this paper, is Bodin’s fundamental distinction between 
sovereignty which in that context can be understood as the perpetual, absolute 
possibility of using power, and government which is the actual exercise of authority 
not necessarily by the sovereign himself; indeed, ideally not by the sovereign at 
all. “But the best kind of Commonweale,” Bodin believed, “is that, wherein the 
soveraigne holdeth what concerneth his majestie, the Senat maintaineth the au-
thoritie thereof, the magistrats execute their power, and justice hath her ordinarie 
course.”44 To use one’s sovereign power and get directly involved in the sphere of 
government by taking upon oneself “the authoritie of the Senat, or the commaunds, 
offices, or jusrisdictions of the magistrats” is “to be feared, least that they [sover-
eigns] destitute of all helpe, shall at the length be spoyled of their owne soveraigne 
majestie also.”45 “The true marks of majestie thereunto still reserved,” Bodin stated 
42 O. Ulph, Jean Bodin..., p. 293. “The very restriction of the power of the king became, para-
doxically, a positive assertion of sovereignty. The king did not possess the power to divest the crown 
of power.” 
43 J. Bodin, The Six Bookes..., p. 222.
44 Ibidem, p. 518.
45 Ibidem.
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in a paradoxical passage, “the lesse the power of the soveraigntie is [...] the more 
it is assured.”46 From theoretical perspective this discussion might seem to be of 
secondary importance (after all the sovereign can shape the institutional structure 
of the commonwealth in whatever way he likes – there is no theoretical necessity 
of that distinction), but it is a characteristic feature of Bodin’s reasoning, traceable 
throughout entire text of République, namely his disillusioned recognition of real-
ity and a kind of soft law, that although not legally binding, is nevertheless highly 
advisable to ensure the stability of the kingdom.47 What is more, this soft law and 
especially the sovereign-government distinction allows Bodin to contain within his 
theory of state virtually innumerable existing forms of exercising authority without 
giving up the consistency of the whole theoretical structure.48 It also seems to form 
yet another constraint on sovereign’s power, even though one of practical rather 
than legal character.
The discussion which highlights the complicated institutional framework of 
Renaissance monarchy can be found in Book III, where Bodin devotes a consid-
erable amount of space to analysing various types of magistrates and their legal 
standing. First, he discusses “central” institutions, starting with the council, which 
is “a lawfull assemblie of Councellors of Estate, to give advise to them which have 
the soveraigntie in everie Commonweale.”49 Its existence is desirable as “there is 
nothing that giveth greater credit and authoritie unto the lawes and commande-
ments of a prince, a people, or state or in any manner of Commonweale, than to 
cause them to passe by the advise of a grave and wise Senat or Councell.”50 As 
Bodin rushes to inform his readers, however, the council is not necessary to the 
state’s existence, because “a prince may be so wise and discreet, as that he can-
not find better councell than his owne.”51 The magistrates on the other hand are 
“one of the most principall parts of a Commonweale, which cannot stand without 
Officers and Commisioners.”52 Bodin cut right through the old disputes regarding 
the legal standing of magistrates (e.g. whether they held jurisdiction as their own 
46 Ibidem, p. 517.
47 That aspect of Bodin’s reasoning made him a somewhat unexpected ally of Machiavelli, 
whom he had supposedly wanted to denounce. Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, p. 284.
48 D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., p. 195. 
49 J. Bodin, The Six Bookes..., p. 253.
50 Ibidem, p. 254.
51 Ibidem, p. 253. 
52 Ibidem, p. 278. A detailed discussion of Bodin’s distinction between two types of officers can 
be found in: D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., pp. 208–217. Characteristically, Bodin preferred “ordi-
nary” magistrates, who derived their authority from the law rather than directly from the arbitrary 
will of the sovereign and who had the crucial ability to shape their administrative decisions as local 
circumstances required. As he puts it: “[...] the Edicts and lawes leave many things to the conscienc-
es and discretions of the Magistrats: who indifferently applie and interpret the lawes according to 
the occurrents & exigence of the causes presented: Whereas Commissioners are otherwise bound, 
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dominium or merely as usufruct) and claimed that an “Officer therefore is a publike 
person, who hath an ordinarie charge by law limited unto him. A Commisioner is 
a publike person, but with an extraordinarie charge limited unto him, without law, 
by vertue of commission onely.”53 Clearly, because the law (and the commission) 
were ultimately coterminous with sovereign’s will, the existence of magistrates’ 
offices depended entirely upon his decision.54 Precisely because of that, magistrates 
and commissioners could be seen as indispensable on the basis of realities of the 
sixteenth-century French kingdom rather than as necessary consequences of the 
theory itself. After all, Bodin did admit that: “the first Commonweales were by 
soveraigne power governed without law, the princes word, becke, and will, serving 
in stead of all lawes.”55
 After describing the legal status of various magistrates, however, Bodin moves 
on to discuss the role played within the state by “Corporations, and Colledges, 
Estates, and Communities.”56 It is precisely in this discussion that Bodin attempts 
to incorporate the varied local structures of power into his theory. Analogically as 
in the case of the council and magistrates, a commonwealth without those associ-
ations is a theoretical possibility for it “may be so strait, as that it may have neither 
corporation nor colledges, but onely many families in it.”57 Interestingly, Bodin 
links the emergence of these local structures to difficulties on the sovereign’s part 
to effectively control his subjects. As we learn: “the princes and lawgivers which 
first founded Commonweals, who had not yet discovered the difficulties they 
were to prove, to keep & maintaine their subjects by the way of justice, ordained 
and maintained fraternities, communities, and colledges; to the end, that the parts 
and members of the self same body of a Commonweale, being at accord among 
themselves, it might be for them the more easie to rule the whole Commonweale 
together.”58 They play a significant role in the workings of the commonwealth’s 
machinery as they are instituted “either for religion, or for policie, and so concerne 
but wordly things.”59 Corporations of judges (such as Parlement of Paris) and of 
magistrates, assemblies of estates (including the Estates General and provincial 
and as it were tyed unto the verie words of their commission, and especially where question is of the 
affaires of state.” J. Bodin, The Six Bookes..., p. 289.
53 Ibidem, p. 278.
54 That all magistrates derived their authority from the king was already claimed by Du Mou-
lin, although he operated within the tradition of thought that employed the terminology of domi-
nium to analyse respective positions of kings and magistrates. H.A. Lloyd, Constitutionalism [in:] 
J.H. Burns, M. Goldie (eds.), The Cambridge History..., p. 262.
55 Ibidem, p. 293.
56 Ibidem, p. 361.
57 Ibidem.
58 Ibidem, p. 363.
59 Ibidem, p. 364.
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estates), communities of towns and villages – all these institutional forms are in-
corporated en bloc into Bodin’s vision of the state.60
It is true that these institutions are not treated by Bodin as legally “immune” 
communities that can exist without sovereign’s acceptance; on the contrary, Bodin 
informs his readers that “everie corporation or college, is a lawfull communitie or 
consociation under a soveraigne power,” a definition which implies that without the 
sovereign’s permission “there can be no colledge.”61 The sovereign’s entitlement to 
control local communities is particularly important, as “colledges and communities 
evill governed, draw after them many factions, seditions, part-takings, monopo-
lies, yea and sometime the ruine of the whole Commonweale also.”62 Here he is 
speaking of the ruin which he saw with his own eyes and which we described in 
the preceding chapter. And yet, despite his own diagnosis, he never went as far 
as to advocate a fully centralized administration of political life. Not only did he 
unequivocally assert the necessity of associations, stating that “[...] to demaund, 
whether communities and colledges be necessarie in a Commonweale is as much, 
as to demaund, Whether that a Commonweale can be maintained and upholden 
without love and amitie without which the world it selfe cannot long stand;”63 he 
also gave his own answer to the institutional struggles of the monarchy: “[...] the 
just Monarchie, hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of 
the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king 
to levie money, to raise forces, to maintaine the Estate against the enemie, it cannot 
be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of every Province, Towne, and 
Communitie.”64 Bodin’s response to the ongoing crisis did not consist in replacing 
the local power structures with a single, unified will of the sovereign, but rather 
in emphasizing the ultimate dependence of these structures upon that will, while 
at the same time firmly recognizing them as virtually indispensable elements of 
commonwealth’s framework. Bodin firmly believed that the ruler “must varie the 
estate of the Commonweale to the diversitie of places; like unto a good Architect, 
which doth fit his building according to the stuffe hee finds upon the place.”65 
That “local” perspective may perhaps be of lesser theoretical importance for the 
subsequent thinkers than the usually recognized constraints of the sovereign power 
in the form of natural law, divine law, and the fundamental laws of the kingdom, 
60 Ibidem, pp. 364–365.
61 Ibidem, p. 365. 
62 Ibidem, p. 380.
63 Ibidem p. 379.
64 Ibidem, p. 384. Italics added.
65 Ibidem, p. 547. Bodin elaborated on that point by presenting his peculiar theory of different 
“dispositions” of men that were interdependent with climate (Book V, Chapter 1).
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but it certainly was important for Bodin and, in his eyes, strongly qualified the 
sovereign power.
 Monarchy, as Bodin very well knew, was in no position to contest the pre-
rogatives of all local networks of power, nor should it attempt to do so. Bodin’s 
response to the ongoing crisis of royal power and his advice for the king can thus 
appear to be somewhat disheartening for Valois sovereigns. Bodin did indeed state 
clearly that, although it was in their legal capacity to dispense with unruly local 
assemblies, disobedient magistrates, malcontent councillors, and seditious noble 
factions, to stay in control of the state without them was virtually impossible. 
Something that the sons of Henry II knew all too well themselves and what was 
soon to be fully exploited by Brutus in the Vindiciae contra tyrannos to which we 
now turn our attention.
VINDICIAE, CONTRA TYRANNOS
The Vindiciae, contra tyrannos published in 1579 was the most notorious 
Monarchomach treatise that appeared during the French Wars of Religion. It is 
usually seen as the final, most complete statement of the so-called Huguenot theory 
of revolution which had previously been developed by inter alios François Hotman 
(in Franco-Gallia published in 1573) and Theodore Beza (in De iure magistratuum 
published in 1574).66 Brutus, just as Hotman and Beza before him, differed from 
the numerous partisan pamphleteers who employed sectarian, religious arguments 
to viciously attack the king and his court (especially after the St. Bartholomew’s 
Day Massacre). He understood the realities of the sixteenth-century France well 
enough to realise that the only way for the Protestants to survive was to appeal to 
the moderate Catholics, who were more interested in thwarting the far-reaching 
ambitions of the Valois monarchs and protecting their own status within the kingdom 
than in waging yet another costly and divisive war against their compatriots.67 Ac-
cordingly, the theory developed in the Vindiciae was based upon legal and political 
arguments that could, at least potentially, be accepted on both sides of the religious 
division. That, however, did not mean that Brutus’s treatise was but a mixture of 
commonplaces. On the contrary, the Vindiciae offered a comprehensive analysis of 
“the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince,” 
that was radical both in its axioms and in its conclusions. We shall begin with 
a brief outline of the Vindiciae’s main arguments before taking a closer look at the 
66 Ralph Giesey famously called them “the Monarchomach Triumvirs.” R. Giesey, The Monar-
chomach Triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and Mornay, “Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance” 
1970, Vol. 32, No. 1.
67 Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, p. 305. 
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ways in which Brutus addressed the existing tension between the local and central 
institutions. As a result, we hope to show that, in the eyes of the Huguenot writer, 
the dispersed network of power within the French kingdom might have been more 
important than it is generally acknowledged.
The ideological stance adopted by Brutus in order to denounce the supposedly 
illegal actions of the king was, for the most part, based upon the assumptions that 
had already been present in the works of his Huguenot predecessors.68 The most 
important and at the same time the most controversial of those assumptions was the 
supposed superiority of the people over the king, a crucial point of departure for 
a Huguenot writer wishing to prove the legitimacy of opposing the royal authority. 
Accordingly, arguments from virtually every possible source were employed to 
solidify that very foundation of the entire theoretical structure. In the first place, 
the Scripture was used to prove that the existence of the royal authority within the 
commonwealth was not a theoretical necessity and that it was perfectly possible to 
have a functioning body politic with no king whatsoever. After all, “several ages 
before the people of Israel petitioned God for a king,” Brutus reminded his readers, 
“God had already sanctioned the law of the kingdom which is found in Deuter-
onomy.”69 Secondly, the same conclusion could also be corroborated by a simple 
observation that it would be absurd to have a king without a people to rule over. 
As Brutus explained it, “since no-one is born a king, no-one is a king in himself, 
and no-one can rule without a people. But, on the contrary, a people can exist of 
itself, and is prior in time to a king.”70 What followed was that “all kings were first 
constituted by the people.”71 That established, Brutus could then confidently state 
that “as kings are constituted by the people, it seems definitely to follow that the 
whole people is more powerful than the king. For such is the force of the word: 
one who is constituted by another is held to be lesser; and one who receives his 
authority from another is inferior to his appointer.”72 In the realities of the sixteenth 
century France it was a radical conclusion that not only forced Brutus to rely on 
rather dubious historical examples derived both from the history of France and of 
other commonwealths to prove its practical applicability, but also created a range of 
theoretical problems that had to be answered if the whole structure was to remain 
consistent and support the Huguenot political agenda.
68 It is important to note, however, that Brutus’s predecessors themselves drew heavily from 
many intellectual sources, for instance from the conciliarism that opposed the absolutist ambitions 
of the Pope. See e.g. F. Oakley, Almain and Major: Conciliar Theory on the Eve of the Reformation, 
“The American Historical Review” 1965, Vol. 70, No. 3. 
69 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 68.
70 Ibidem, p. 71.
71 Ibidem.
72 Ibidem, p. 74. 
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Firstly, the way in which the multitude of people could be said to act and to 
be superior to the king standing at the top of the governmental hierarchy had to 
be explained. Brutus resolved that problem by using a time-honoured juridical 
concept of universitas – a fictional, corporate entity that was capable, through its 
representatives, of expressing its corporate will and thus of taking legal actions.73 
That pivotal representative role was then, following the Protestant tradition, said 
to be performed by the magistrates, who “have received authority from the peo-
ple,” and who by virtue of that grant represented “the whole assembled people.”74 
Their responsibilities were subsequently analysed in terms of the law of tutorship. 
As Brutus explained it, “just as a tutor ought to take care lest his ward’s goods 
be lost – and unless he does so, is liable to an action of tutorship – so the princes 
were obliged to protect the safety of the people, which has handed itself over and 
committed itself entirely into their charge, and which has, in a way, transferred to 
them all its legal capacity.”75 This juridical concept allowed Brutus to present the 
people as the only dominus of the commonwealth i.e. the real sovereign, and at the 
same time to essentially strip it from any possibility of a direct action which could 
be carried out only by the tutors, precisely because the people, as their “ward” 
was incapable of doing so.76 When Brutus subsequently moved on to analyse the 
contractual obligations of the king and the people, the fiction of the corporate entity 
and its representatives could conveniently be employed not only to explain how the 
people was able to form any contract with the monarch in the first place, but also 
to show who was obliged to act in case its terms were breached. It was an issue of 
crucial importance because the Vindiciae’s argument regarding the right to oppose 
the king relied heavily upon two separate contracts or covenants. 
The first, religious one was “a sacred covenant between God, king, and peo-
ple.”77 The king, who had initially gained his authority as a precarious grant from 
God, subsequently “confirmed” by the people’s vote, promised to rule within the 
boundaries of the divine law as well as to ensure that the people under his com-
mand duly fulfilled its Christian duties. On the other hand, the people, or rather 
the magistrates on its behalf, pledged to do just that – to obey God’s commands, 
and to see to it that the king did so as well. The precise extent of these duties was 
then analysed using terms derived from the Roman civil law, specifically the joint 
stipulation, to the effect that God could be treated as a stipulator (thus having no 
obligations of his own) while both the king and the people functioned as “co-debt-
ors” who ought to carry out their contractual responsibilities “lest either of them 
73 D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., p. 128. 
74 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 46.
75 Ibidem, p. 49.
76 D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., pp. 128–131.
77 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae...., p. 21.
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should pay the penalty for the other.”78 “Finally,” as Brutus put it, “as when two 
parties have promised – especially in those contracts where the pledge is forfeited 
as a result of any fault [...] – the fault of one harms the other.”79 The duty to act was 
in no way limited by the existing framework of the positive law. Since the divine 
law was treated as superior to any other system of legal norms, and because every 
legitimate form of power was ultimately said to be of divine character, it followed 
that to disobey God’s commands was to lose all legitimacy.80 As a result, a failure 
on the king’s part to keep the terms of the covenant at the same time stripped him of 
his royal authority, just as an unfaithful vassal would have forfeited his fief by diso-
beying his liege, and activated the people’s duty to oppose his ungodly commands 
lest “they would be dispersed and destroyed” by God’s wrath.81 That, as we have 
seen, could only be done by the magistrates representing the corporate capacity of 
the people.82 The tripartite covenant was thus put in place to guarantee the Chris-
tian character of the kingdom. The kernel of the Huguenot agenda, however, lay 
precisely in an attempt not to accuse the king of breaking the religious covenant, 
or at least not to rely entirely on that argument, as many Frenchmen either did not 
think that was the case or, to the Huguenots’ despair, went as far as to criticize the 
king for failing to crush the Protestant movement. Some other justification of the 
resistance against the king had to be established.
Brutus found such justification in the terms of the second covenant which 
had a secular character and was formed between the people, acting as a stipulator 
through its magistrates and the king who pledged to “rule justly and according to 
reason.”83 The people was bound to obey the king only “as long as he commanded 
justly.”84 That, in turn, was a clear indication that “the king promised absolutely, 
and the people conditionally.”85 That specific contractual formulation of mutual 
78 Ibidem.
79 Ibidem, p. 40.
80 Ibidem, p. 27. 
81 Ibidem, p. 42. This shift from the logic of stipulation to the vassal-liege relationship between 
God and the king was a characteristic feature of Brutus’s eclectic style of argumentation. He was 
rarely concerned with the mutual compatibility of the adduced arguments, instead employing them 
as his current narrative demanded. That, to be sure, only added to the complexity of the work. 
82 Brutus, unlike Beza and Hotman, did state that God might occasionally send a special aveng-
er of the people who could lawfully kill the tyrant, but he saw that possibility as rather unlikely and 
advised his readers to “be especially sober and circumspect in this matter.” Ibidem, p. 62. See also 
Q. Skinner, The Foundations..., vol. 2, p. 306.
83 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 130. As George Garnett explains it in the footnote No. 
439, the use of stipulation to describe the mutual obligations of the magistrates and the king was 
rather problematic as, by definition, the party that stipulated had no obligations at all towards the 
party that promised. 
84 Ibidem.
85 Ibidem.
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relationship between the king and the people allowed Brutus to once again reas-
sert the people’s superiority over the king and to delineate its precise extent. The 
king could only operate within the legal boundaries agreed on by the people. The 
kingship was neither a form of dominium nor an usufruct, but a function that was 
limited in its prerogatives and subject to control of the real sovereign – the people, 
that could hold the king responsible for his illegal actions.86 To be sure, the legal 
boundaries themselves were also subject to heated debates as the struggles between 
the Parlement and the king clearly showed. From the analytical standpoint, however, 
the king was put in a peculiar position as he seemed to be, in a way, conceptually 
removed from the legal body of the people even after the contractual relationship 
between him and the people had been established. He was but an external agent 
tasked chiefly with the administration of justice and, if need be, with fighting off 
the external enemies of the kingdom. As Brutus succinctly summarized it, kings 
“are constituted by the people, and benefit is to be understood in terms of these 
two things – justice between citizens and courage against enemies.”87 In order to 
“defend individuals from each other” the king had to be recognized as superior to 
every other individual magistrate. Since, however, he performed his role solely on 
the contractual basis and possessed no representative capacity, he was also inferior 
to the magistrates (or to the majority of them) taken as a whole who were both the 
people’s tutors and its representatives. Certainly, it was an enticing vision for all the 
advocates of the Estates General that could be treated as the highest, extraordinary 
representative institution of the people, legally entitled to carry out the much-needed 
reform of the kingdom, even without the consent of the king himself. As we have 
seen, however, the problem was that once the Estates General finally gathered, it 
quickly became obvious that virtually none of the people’s representatives that 
attended the Estates was particularly interested in defending the Huguenots’ cause.88 
As a result, although at this stage the theory was already radical, Brutus still 
had to find a way to justify the resistance of individual magistrates in case the vast 
majority of the kingdom’s officials cooperated with the tyrannical king instead 
of opposing him, as that, from the Huguenot perspective, seemed to be happen-
86 Ibidem, p. 125.
87 Ibidem, p. 96.
88 That the Vindiciae’s preface was dated 1 January 1577 could hardly be a coincidence. As 
George Garnett writes, “According to Pierre de Lestoile [...] it was on this day that Henri III de-
clared that he intended to have only one form of religious worship in his kingdom, and revoked 
the concessions to the contrary which he had made to the Huguenots in the paix de Monsieur, and 
formalised in the treaty of Beaulieu of May 1576.” Ibidem, footnote 17, p. 13. As we have seen in 
the first chapter, Henri’s decision was largely based upon the will of the Estates General themselves. 
Philipp Mornay, who might have written the Vindiciae, was one of the few Huguenots who attended 
the Estates of 1576, thus witnessing firsthand the king’s decision. M. Holt, Attitudes of the French 
Nobility..., p. 492. 
164 Maciej Wilmanowicz 
ing in France. It is precisely at this point, that the local framework of the French 
kingdom became particularly important. Crucially, that framework seemed to be 
inextricably linked to the character of the people itself. Unlike Bodin, who saw 
the commonwealth as an entity that could only be said to exist when there was 
a single, unitary sovereign power to hold it together, Brutus accepted the universal 
sovereignty of the people in every legitimate commonwealth and at the same time 
admitted a possible structural variety within the corporate people i.e. the sovereign 
itself.89 When Brutus tried to elaborate on his characterization of the whole people 
as a corporate entity represented by its magistrates, he characteristically described 
the way in which those magistrates had been constituted in the first place simply 
by saying that they had been “chosen by the people, or constituted in some other 
way.”90 Historical examples cited by Brutus seem to confirm that although he saw 
the people as a corporate entity, it did not, in his eyes, follow that it had no internal 
structure of its own. In the kingdom of Israel, for instance, “there were the lead-
ers or princes of tribes, one from each; then the judges and prefects of individual 
cities – that is, the captains of thousands, of hundreds, and others – who presided 
over as many families as there were.”91 Those local magistrates had in their charge 
particular elements, or parts of the kingdom that could be analytically distinguished 
from the corporate whole. As Brutus put it, “we are talking about some province or 
city which forms a part of a kingdom, just as prow, stern, and keel are said to make 
up parts of a ship, and roof, walls, and foundations parts of a house; and about any 
magistrate who has that province or city in his charge.”92 
The theoretical importance of the internal division of the kingdom resulted 
from the fact that, according to Brutus, the local magistrates could act on behalf 
of the communities, or “parts of the kingdom” that remained under their control. 
Importantly, however, the exact extent of their legal entitlement to oppose the royal 
authority depended on the character of the contract that had been breached, very 
much in line with the cautious Huguenot approach. When discussing the terms of 
the religious covenant Brutus stated that “individual cities, and the magistrates of 
89 In that regard it is interesting to note that the methodological claim put forth in the Vindici-
ae’s preface seems to constitute an outright opposite of Bodin’s approach. We are not told to trace 
the ramifications of a clearly stated definition, but rather to observe how “from the effects and con-
sequences [Brutus] inferred the causes and major propositions or rulers, in order to demonstrate the 
matter more clearly and definitely.” As an effect, the theory was to be built by the author by “ascend-
ing through certain degrees to the peak: so that in the manner of geometricians – whom he seems to 
have wanted to imitate in this matter – from a point he draws a line, from the line a plane, and from 
the plane he constitutes a solid.” The supposed quality of that method of argumentation would mean 
that all those who reject its conclusions “are manifestly reprobates”, and that “those who cannot 
perceive what all together as a whole [universi] seem are evidently blind.” Ibidem, pp. 10–11.
90 Ibidem, p. 46. Italics added.
91 Ibidem. Italics added.
92 Ibidem, p. 50.
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individual cities which form part of the kingdom, individually promised the same 
[to obey the divine law, just as the whole kingdom did] in explicit terms, in so far 
as it concerned their own interests.”93 The dispersed character of the pledge to obey 
the divine law allowed Brutus to claim that every “part” of the commonwealth was 
bound to oppose any action on the king’s part that breached the covenant with God. 
Furthermore, since the divine law was truly universal in a sense that no territorial 
or jurisdictional limits could be applied to the body of the faithful constituting the 
catholic94 Church, it followed that every single community that pledged to obey 
God’s commands had a duty to oppose the king, who acted contrary to the divine 
will, not only by protecting the faith within its own borders, but also by actively 
resisting the monarch who, as a result of breaking the divine law, lost his legitimacy. 
After all, all the magistrates representing the people, and the local communities, 
were first and foremost bound to God as they were his “vassals,” and only sec-
ondarily to the king. The argument as it stood, however, could certainly be used 
to reassure the Huguenots themselves, but it could hardly convince the Catholic 
majority of the kingdom.95
What could, on the other hand, be attractive from the perspective of the Catho-
lics struggling against the Valois monarchy, was the magistrates’ role with regard 
to the secular covenant. Here Brutus clearly distinguished between the officials 
whose jurisdiction embraced the whole kingdom, and the local magistrates who 
were said to be responsible solely for the specific part of the kingdom under their 
control. “And there are,” Brutus informed us, “dukes, marquisses, counts, viscounts, 
barons, and castellans; and similarly in cities, mayors, bailiffs, consuls, syndics, 
municipal officials [scabini], and others, who have a region or city commended to 
them individually, in order to protect the people within the extent of their jurisdic-
tion – albeit some of these dignities have become hereditary in our time.”96 The 
crucial question, however, from both the political and theoretical perspective, was 
how these magistrates were elected and by extension whether they acted as the 
representatives of the respective parts under their control or were simply protect-
ing them. As we have already indicated, Brutus stated that the magistrates were 
“chosen by the people, or constituted in some other way.”97 George Garnett, who 
has translated the Vindiciae and written a comprehensive analysis of its argument, 
argues that “the author’s assumption appears to be that they [the local magistrates] 
93 Ibidem, p. 52. Italics added.
94 Brutus deliberately used this term in its original meaning (i.e. “universal”) when he wrote the 
following phrase “when all Christian kings are inaugurated, they receive the sword expressly for the 
protection of the catholic – or whole – church.” Ibidem, p. 175.
95 G. Garnett, Introduction, p. xlix.
96 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 86. 
97 Ibidem, p. 46.
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are also appointed by the whole people in the public council, for they are bound to 
render assistance ‘to that part which the people entrusted to them after the king.’”98 
A tactical reason is then provided to shed some light upon the supposedly centralized 
system of the magistrates’ appointment. “[...] it would be tactless,” Garnett notes, 
“and blatantly at odds with the facts, to claim that the nobles – to whom Cono Su-
perantius claims the book is addressed – in any ‘part’ of the kingdom owed their 
offices to the people of that ‘part.’”99
It is true that Brutus is rather cryptic about the ways in which the magistrates 
could be said to obtain their posts. As we have already argued, it might have been 
a result of his acceptance of the diversified internal structure of the kingdom, thus 
constituting an attempt to appeal to the local nobles by recognizing the diverse local 
foundations of their offices rather than by deriving all of them (very much in the 
Bodinian fashion) from the centralized decision of the public council representing 
the whole kingdom. There are two additional hints which might perhaps indicate 
that Brutus did indeed see the local “parts” of the kingdom as being able to choose 
their own officials. In the first place, Brutus made it clear, in an astonishing passage, 
that on entering any city or province the king “is obliged to confirm its privileges, 
and binds himself by oath to its laws and customs. This applies expressly to the 
inhabitants of Toulouse of Dauphiné, of Britanny, of Provence, and of La Rochelle, 
who have very clear agreements [conventiones] with kings which would all be in 
vain, unless they were considered to hold the place of a condition in contract.”100 
That passage seems to indicate that the local parts of the kingdom were entitled 
to autonomously shape their own contractual relationship with the king. In other 
words, the local communities could be represented as quasi-separate legal entities 
(although always remaining within the framework of the corporate whole). Conse-
quently, to claim that all the local magistrates were appointed on the “central” level 
would make for a rather peculiar theory in which the local “inhabitants” would have 
their unique legal entitlements and obligations shaped by the agents not of their 
direct choosing. Secondly, the centralized appointment of the magistrates would 
run counter to the Huguenot political agenda. If the centralized public council was 
to be responsible for electing every single magistrate, then the legal standing of the 
local magistrates would be entirely dependent upon its decision and it would be 
difficult to see how a single city or a single magistrate could possibly oppose the 
public council that acted against him, just as the Estates General had done at Blois. 
Garnett’s argument would seem more plausible if we were to see the magistrates 
solely as the tutors responsible for the well-being of their wards, very much like the 
king. The people as a whole could then be said to form one complicated contract 
98 G. Garnett, Introduction, p. xxxix.
99 Ibidem.
100 Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 135.
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with the king, that contained all the unique, local arrangements of the kingdom’s 
parts, and to subsequently choose local tutors responsible for protecting these ar-
rangements. However, the crucial part of Brutus’s reasoning was precisely that the 
magistrates were tasked with the well-being of their wards’ rights and were acting 
as their representatives, something that could not have been said about the king. The 
example of the kingdom of Israel in which “not only the princes of tribes, but also 
all the captains of thousands, of hundreds, and inferior magistrates were present, 
in the name of various cities, which were covenanting [paciscerentur] individually 
and by themselves with the king,”101 seems to show that the local magistrates were 
indeed responsible not only for the protection of their inhabitants, but could also 
represent their “local” will that was not coterminous with the will of the whole 
kingdom.102 That, in turn, might mean that Brutus recognized the existing frame-
work of the local powers as being dependent upon the decision (or tradition, since 
the magistrates were said to be hereditary in some areas of the kingdom) of the 
respective local parts of the commonwealth. An important claim that could be used 
to oppose the royal officials aiming to enforce the king’s will upon the provinces.103 
Regardless of these considerations, it is clear that Brutus’s analysis of the secular 
covenant could, at least theoretically, be accepted by the Catholic opponents of 
the Valois monarchy. The exhortations to the French nobles, who should see to it 
that “the ancient rights of the peoples should be restored in their entirety amongst 
the Gauls [...] who are free by nature and entirely autonomous in their way of life 
and the laws and practices of antiquity”104 played very well into the wide-spread 
anti-centralization sentiment that we have traced in the first chapter. The supposed 
superiority of the people over the king was a powerful tool that could be used 
to counter the unpopular policy of the monarch not on the basis of the practical 
inadequacy of the royal government (as the Estates used to do anyway), but on 
the basis of the inviolable right. The popular election of the magistrates could be 
seen as an indication of the superiority of the traditional administrative network 
of France, dominated by the local nobles, over the officials appointed by the king, 
101 Ibidem, p. 130. Italics added.
102 In that regard, it would tempting to see Brutus’s argument as an antecedent of the famous 
theory of state as a compound consociatio symbiotica developed by Johannes Althusius in 1603. For 
a brief analysis of that theory see D. Lee, Popular Sovereignty..., pp. 237–242.
103 As Brutus argued, the French king could only be “received into princely office” after having 
promised the individual magistrates to uphold “the ancestral laws.” “This,” he continued, “is the 
case to such an extent that they [in this context – the king] cannot in any way alter the laws [iura] of 
provinces, or even the municipal ones of individual cities, without the consent of those provinces or 
municipalities.” Anonymous (1579), Vindiciae..., p. 101. 
104 Ibidem, p. 8. In fact, the Guises themselves used similar arguments to justify their actions 
as the monarchy was said to “had become too weak to defend the catholic faith.” What was needed, 
the Guises claimed, was “the assistance of its [the kingdom’s] natural defenders (the nobility).” 
M. Greengrass, Governing Passions..., p. 85.
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while at the same time the nature of the contract between the king and the magis-
trates mitigated the potentially dangerous anarchical implications of allowing the 
people to oppose its supreme magistrate and his representatives. Different local 
arrangements were to be treated as binding elements of the secular contract itself, 
that could, or in fact had to, be protected by the local magistrates who were first 
and foremost responsible for the well-being of the citizens directly under their con-
trol – another powerful argument that could be employed by both the Catholics and 
Huguenots. 
The Vindiciae offered a radical solution to the crisis of the Valois monarchy. 
Having identified the illegal actions of the king as the roots of evil, Brutus tried to 
appeal to the inferior magistrates by effectively creating a powerful legal justifica-
tion of the actions that they had already been taking for a long period of time i.e. 
opposing the royal decisions that run counter to their interests or beliefs. The king 
was to yield to the commands of the Estates General, not the other way around. 
He was to respect the specific legal arrangements of the local parts of the kingdom 
and by extension the local networks of power that aimed to protect them. It was 
not, as Bodin tried to argue, a matter of convenience, but of duty. 
CONCLUSION
The chasm between the practical implications of the theories of Bodin and 
Brutus for the French kingdom could hardly be wider. It was, therefore, just as 
paradoxical, as it was indicative of the realities of the Valois monarchy, that both 
Bodin and Brutus decided to emphasize the importance of the local networks of 
power for the functioning of the kingdom. Although Bodin and Brutus differed when 
it came to the legal standing of those networks, they nevertheless did agree, albeit 
for different reason, that the complex institutional structure of France was there 
to stay and could not simply be ignored. They also seemed to share the belief that 
in every commonwealth there could only be a single sovereign power. However, 
because in the French context they ascribed that power to different agents and con-
sequently based the entire legal system of the state upon different foundations, their 
theories, despite certain similarities, could only lead to two completely opposite 
answers to the crisis of the kingdom. The echo of those answers was to reverberate 
throughout Europe for decades, delineating two distinct modes of thinking about 
the state, sovereignty and local structures of power. 
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze two significant treatises concerning the constitu-
tional structure of the 16th century French monarchy, namely Jean Bodin’s Les Six livres de 
la République and Vindiciae, contra tyrannos written under the pseudonym of Brutus. The 
texts were answers to an ongoing institutional crisis of the monarchy, especially in light of 
the strictly connected issues of decentralization and the weakness of the royal administrative 
apparatus. The paper portrays how the tension between the royal administration and the 
complicated structure of the local networks of power not only rendered it impossible for 
both Bodin and Brutus not to take a stance on the matter but also how it influenced the shape 
of their theories. An analysis of how Brutus and Bodin tried to incorporate the complex 
institutional realities of the French kingdom into their own theories sheds some light on 
the authors’ attitude towards the functioning of the local centres of power, their theoretical 
disabling or using them on purpose; it also points to how much the actual decentralization 
of the state influenced the shape of the theories of both authors.
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